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BURDEN OF PROOF AND. PRESUMPTIONS
IN WILL CONTESTS IN TENNESSEE
EDMUND M. MORGAN*

Burden of proof is a slippery phrase. It is used to describe the burden
of producing evidence sufficient to justify a finding or the burden of persuading the trier to make a finding or both these burdens.' Thayer noted the
confusion in the judicial opinions caused by this loose use of language. In
his essay, in attempting to bring order into the subject, he stated first that
the burden of persuasion is fixed by the pleadings or their equivalent at
a stage of the proceedings preliminary to trial and second, that once fixed,
it never shifts. These pronouncements have received verbal approval in
numberless judicial opinions. 2 The Tennessee courts have joined this chorus. a
Alciatus, writing of the civil law in the sixteenth century, declared the
subject of presumptions to be almost inextricably confused; Best, in 1844,
found the common law in like condition; and Thayer, in 1898, agreed but
thought that he could "relieve the subject of much of its obscurity." 4 The
obscurity is deepened because presumption is a tricky word, encrusted with
confusing judicial glosses. It is always used to express a relationship between two facts or groups of facts; but not always the same relationship.
It may be said that if A is established, B is conclusively presumed. This is
merely laying down a rule of substantive law, which might much better be
expressed in other terms. For example, that a child under seven years of
age is conclusively presumed to be incapable of committing a felony means
only that a child under that age cannot be held criminally responsible for
conduct which in an adult would be a felony. Or a court may declare that
since A was established, B was presumed, meaning that the trier justifiably
drew the inference of the existence of B. Or the statement that given A, B
is presumed may mean that when A is established in an action, the trier
must assume the existence of B unless and until certain specified conditions
are fulfilled. The Tennessee courts have recognized these different usages.
They have classified presumptions as presumptions of fact and presumptions
*Frank C. Rand, Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law.
1. Since evidence received at a trial may be used to support the case of the party
against whom it is offered as well* as that of the party who offers it, each burden
would be more accurately described, as Wigmore has shown, as a risk, i.e., the risk of
nonproduction of evidence, and the risk of nonpersuasion. 9 WIOaxORE, EVIDENcE §§ 2485,
2487 (3d ed. 1940).
2. Space does not permit discussion of the arbitrary character of this generalization, and its disregard of the reasons which govern the allocation of the burden.
3. See, e.g., Whipple v. McKew, 166 Tenn. 31, 34, 60 S.W.2d 1006 (1932) ; Illinois
Cen. R.R. v. H. Rouw & Co., 25 Tenn. App. 475, 479, 159 S.W.2d 839 (W.S. 1940).
4. See THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE C0mimoN LAw 313
et seq. (1898).
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of law. Presumptions of fact are said to be natural presumptions meaning
logically justifiable inferences.5 Presumptions of law are of two kinds, conclusive and rebuttable or disputable. The conclusive presumptions are easily
distinguishable and create no difficulty in application. It is the rebuttable
presumption that causes trouble, and many courts label it a true presumption.
It was with this that Thayer dealt and tried to reduce to its lowest terms.
He concluded that the sole effect of a presumption, regardless of the coisiderations which caused its creation or justifies its continued existence, is
to fix the burden of producing evidence sufficient to warrant a finding of
the nonexistence of the presumed fact.0 Although he had little or no authority to support him, his theory has been accepted in innumerable opinions7
and has in many instances received the approval of the Tennessee courts.
It is obvious that if Thayer's theories as to the fixing and shifting of
the burden of proof and of the function of presumptions are applied in
combination, the establishment in an action of facts which raise a presumption can never affect the burden of persuasion. The impracticability of
adhering to such a generalization and the reluctance of the courts to give
it more than lip service in critical situations s are nowhere better illustrated
than in the cases dealing with wills in Tennessee.
In Tennessee a will contest is an original proceeding in the circuit
court to probate the will, and it is immaterial that the contest was instituted
after probate in common form in the county court. Consequently the
proponent begins with both burdens on the issue of execution. When he
shows execution in due form, fair on its face, he makes what the Tennessee
court calls a prima facie case, which in this situation means that a presumption arises; for in the absence of other evidence, the finding of due execution
must follow. But if an attesting witness testifies to noncompliance with a
statutory requirement, then the proponent must present full and clear
evidence of execution according to statute. 9 The presumption has become
functus officio, as Thayer's theory demands.
5. See Beretta v. American Casualty Co. of Reading Pa., 181 Tenn. 118, 124, 178

S.W.2d 753, 755 (1944).
6. See
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et seq. (1898).
7. See, e.g., Shelton v. State, 190 Tenn. 518, 230 S.W.2d 986 (1950); Brown v.
Hows, 163 Tenn. 138, 155, 40 S.W.2d 1017 (1931), rehearing denied, 163 Tenn. 178, 42
S.W.2d 210 (1931), citing with approved Central of Georgia Ry. v. Fuller Combing Gin
Co., 2 Tenn. C.C.A. 343 (1911). If this theory were applied, conflicting presumptions
would necessarily cancel each other, but the Tennessee Supreme Court has held that
this is not true; the stronger overcomes the weaker. See Nichols v. Mutual Life Ins.
Co. of New York, 178 Tenn. 209, 156 S.W.2d 436 (1941).

8. See McMahan v. Tucker, 31 Tenn. App. 429, 216 S.W.2d 356 (WV.S. 1948)

for a full discussion. See also Hammond v. Union Planters Nat. Bank, 189 Tenn. 93,

222 S.W.2d 377 (1949) (presumption of sanity); Southern Motors Inc. v. Morton,
25 Tenn. App. 204, 154 S.W.2d 801, (W.S. 1941).
9. Fann v. Fann, 186 Tenn. 127, 208 S.W.2d 542 (1947). The court concedes
that there are very respectable authorities to the effect that the attesting witness'
repudiation is so highly suspicious as not wholly to destroy the effect of an execution

fair on its face.
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.- On the other hand, if contestant alleges forgery and introduces evidence
of it,. the presumption does not cease to operate. The contestant has the
further burden of persuading the trier.10 Not only does this completely
abandon the Thayerian doctrine; it puts the burden on contestant of disproving an essential allegation of proponent's pleading. The court frankly
concedes the illogic of the ruling, but justifies it on the grounds of policy
and convenience. On like reasoning it has declared that where the circumstances of preparation and execution are shown to be suspicious, the
burden of persuasion is upon the proponent. This must mean that the presumption either does not arise or vanishes, and the burden of persuasion
which contestant's allegation of forgery would normally fix upon him has
either remained with or swung back to the proponent. In Hayes v. Mullins,"
the suspicious circumstances included the physical appearance of the document, but the language of the court did not limit the generalization to the
particular facts.
Where the contest is upon the ground of testamentary incapacity, the
contestant starts with both burdens and is further handicapped by the
presumption that testator was sane. Since reasons of policy, aside from the
presumption, fix both burdens upon contestant, the presumption could have
no effect if Thayer's theory were applied. In some of the Pacific coast states
a presumption is by statute a species of evidence. Commentators have been
almost unanimous in asserting that this statutory mandate involves an
impossible concept and cannot be applied in litigation. But the courts of
those -states have remained unconvinced. The Tennessee Supreme Court is
qually obdurate without statutory compulsion 12 and in its latest pronouncement has said as to the issue of sanity, "...
the same rule applies in contested wills cases as in other civil cases. In other words the question of
testator's alleged insanity 'is to be submitted to the jury on the preponderance
of the evidence with consideration of the presumption in favor of sanity.' 13
If, however, testator's insanity at a date prior to execution of the will is
established in the case, then a presumption of its continuance arises, and the
burden shifts to the proponent to show testator's sanity, and if the
evidence leaves the trier in doubt, the finding of insanity is required. 14 Thus
10. Keys v. Keys, 23 Tenn. App. 188, 129 S.W.2d 1103 (E.S. 1939).
11. 30 Tenn. App. 615, 209 S.W.2d 278 (E.S. 1947).
12. See Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Prieto, 169 Tenn. 124, 76 S.W.2d 314
(1935).
13. Hammond v. Union Planters Nat. Bank, 189 Tenn. 93, 99, 222 S.W.2d 377,
380 (1949).
14. Melody v. Hamblin, 21 Tenn. App. 687, 697, 115 S.W.2d 233 (M.S. 1937);
Bank of Commerce v. Stavros, 20 Tenn. App. 662, 665, 103, S.W.2d 593 MS. 1936);
Bridges v. Agee, 15 Tenn. App. 351, 367 (M.S. 1932).
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in dealing with the issue of insanity, Tennessee utterly repudiates the
conclusions of Thayer.
It is clear that a testator may lack testamentary capacity in being unable
to comprehend the extent of his property and the natural objects of his
bounty and yet fully understand the exact content of the executed document
and intend it to be his will. Ordinarily, the presumption arising from the
proof of execution in due form includes that of testator's understanding
vhat he was doing. But where his signature is by mark or there are other
suspicious circumstances, the presumption either does not arise or loses its
effect when evidence of such circumstances is introduced. Proponent's
showing that testator understood the content of the will must then be full
and clear.'6 Now suppose that contestant's claim is that testator's lack of
understanding of what he was doing was due to mental incapacity. Here the
issue is almost identical with that of lack of testamentary capacity; but
here it concerns also an element of execution, an issue as to which the
burden is, in such a situation, upon the proponent. When faced with the
problem in Burrow v. Lewis,'6 the court met it squarely. The burden was
upon proponent to prove that the testator "comprehended the business in
which he was engaged and understood the contents of the paper signed as
his will. This implies necessarily a showing of soundness of mind at the
very time the will was executed.' 7 The fact that the same condition of
mind was involved in the issue of testamentary capacity did not change the
burden on the issue of due execution.
On the issue of undue ipfluence, the contestant begins with both
burdens and is aided by no presumption unless he can show a confidential
relation between the testator and the person whose undue influence is alleged.
The Tennessee cases have not generally used the term presumption in this
connection but have said that the proponent must fully satisfy the jury that
the testator knew the content of the alleged will and approved it. In Watterson v. Watterson,'8 and Maxwell v. Hill,'9 the will was written by the
beneficiary and was signed by mark. In Nobles v. Farmer,20 the testator was
old, blind and almost deaf, and the beneficiary secured the witnesses and a
notary. The court in the Nobles case laid down the rule: "'When a will is
executed through the intervention of the person occupying an influential
position to his advantage, the law casts upon him the burden of removing the
15. Bartee v. Thompson, 67 Tenn. 508 (1875); Burrow v. Lewis, 24 Tenn. App.

253, 142 S.W.2d 758 (E.S. 1940) ; Walker v. Verble, 5 Tenn. C.C.A. 651, 657 (1915).
16. 24 Tenn. App. 253, 142 S.W.2d 758 (E.S. 1940).
17. Id. at 262, 142 S.W.2d at 763.
18. 38 Tenn. 1 (1858).
19. 89 Tenn. 584, 14 S.W. 253 (1891).
20. 9 Tenn. App. 6 (W.S. 1928).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ Vor,. 5

suspicion by proof showing that the will was the free and voluntary act
of the testator.' "21 On the facts it said that the proponent must show that
he observed the utmost good faith in the preparation and execution of the
will; the burden thus imposed seems to be the burden of persuasion.
Of course, no such situation would arise where the drafting and execution were under the supervision of an attorney. But if a testator intends to
make his attorney a beneficiary, another attorney should see to the execution
of the will and make sure that the testator thoroughly understood what he
was doing and that he was acting upon his own considered judgment.
Though no Tennessee cases of this sort have been found, the books are full
of them; and burden of proof is sometimes the crucial problem in the case.
'Where the contestant alleges revocation, he has the burden of going
forward'and the burden of persuasion. But if the will was in the control of
the testator and cannot be found, a presumption arises that it was revoked.
The revocation, other than by a later will, must be by some injury to the
document itself. There is no such thing as a symbolic destruction of a will. 22
But there seems to be no question that the failure to produce a will that was
in the custody of the testator puts upon the proponent the burden of
persuading the trier that it was not revoked, for the Tennessee court approves
Pritchard's statement which puts execution and lack of revocation in the
same category, so far as proof is concerned. 2 3
It would not be unfair, speaking generally, to conclude that in these
cases the Tennessee courts have dealt with the burden of persuasion upon
the sound principle that it should be fixed as considerations of fairness,
convenience and policy dictate in the situation as it appears at the time the
case is submitted to the trier for decision.
21. Id. at 11. The quotation is from

§ 113 (2d ed., Sizer, 1928).
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22. Gregory v. Susong, 185 Tenn. 232, 205 S.W.2d 6 (1947).
23. Moore v. Williams, 30 Tenn. App. 479, 481, 207 S.W.2d 590, 591 (M.S. 1947),
citing PRITCHARD, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION § 50 (2d ed., Sizer, 1928).

